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 Abstract 
The thesis firstly collects behavioral economics literature to support the 
nudging literature review. Based on the first itineration of the thesis and the 
challenge proposed by Deborah Small and Cynthia Cryder the purpose of the 
thesis is to review and relate literature on the topics of consumers’ inferences 
relating to firms that behave in a prosocial manner. 
Due to the lack of a concrete nudging review which builds its roots on 
behavioral economics, we needed a strong foundation to begin developing the 
topic of nudging as a response to profit-seeking firms who look to behave 
prosocially and earn a positive response from consumers. In addition, there is 
absence of research linking literature on consumer inference and reaction with 
for-profit firms seeking to behave prosocially.  
Through analyzing all major authors and fathers of both nudging, behavioral 
economics, and consumer response towards for-profit firms that positively 
impact society, the thesis compiles relevant information on the perspective of 
consumers. While focusing on the reactance individuals might and indeed have 
of firms, nudging is explored as a solution that not only helps consumer’s 
decision-making but also promotes positive social impact and brings results for 
firms. 
The research leads to believe that nudging is indeed a tool that fits all these 
requirements, as it helps individuals, firms, and societies. The following text 
looks to showcase how nudging, while being heavily developed as a nearly 
selfless tool, may also be utilized for the same good while combining prosocial 
behavior and profit seeking goals. 
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Introduction 
Following 2017’s Nobel prize in Economics Richard Thaler with his 
contributions on Behavioral Economics related to Nudging, alongside the 
classes I attended on the subject at my university, made me interested in the 
capabilities and potential that this subject brought into the status quo of 
economics. Both economics and psychology have always been my two most 
favorite studied subjects. And now, being given the opportunity to further 
develop a topic that combines the two sciences, was a natural choice for me. 
The breakthrough of Behavioral Economics is due to its presuppositions 
differing from classic economics, which is grounded on observed economic 
behavior and supported by the psychological context of choice-architecture. 
Without analyzing decisions through the rigid laws of rationality, observed 
behavior is the core of this science, and it is explained through a combination of 
psychologic and economic impressions.  
My thesis started with a proposal from my supervisor to present possible 
behavioral inducing techniques with prosocial outcome. The technique we 
chose was taught to me by my supervisor and entails behavioral theory. That 
technique is called nudging. It gained most awareness with Thaler and 
Sunstein’s work on the subject. It represents any prosocial intervention that 
respects the concept of libertarian paternalism, as long as it encourages the 
better path for the consumer, through correcting their decision-making flaws. 
There are many possible nudge techniques, such as heuristics. While knowing 
what is best for decision-makers, a nudge seeks to point individuals in the 
direction that best suits their needs, while not restraining choice.  
But to develop on what makes a nudge, and what applications it has seen, 
we must understand its basis, and that is behavioral economics. We will start by 
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going through authors and theory that will create the pillars to understand 
what nudging is based on. The only way to consolidate the needed support on 
behavioral economic science is through understanding how humans have their 
mental processes limited, and thus need orientation.  
However, the current stance of nudges focuses on the impact and decision-
making influence they have on individual’s wellbeing. While it is the focus of a 
nudge itself, we will look into how consumers react to firms that behave with 
positive social impact. To do so, understanding that consumers form beliefs and 
expectations related to social responsibility is a core part of the thesis. We will 
also include a topic where social impact and profit-seeking might be possible 
together, as they appear to be two contradictory concepts in historical literature. 
By first understanding behavioral economics and the tool that is nudging 
through the existing literature, we will then investigate cases where firms 
behave prosocially through nudges. While we start off with examples of firm’s 
impact on several social areas of consumers life, a deep insight into their beliefs, 
expectations, and reactions will be necessary. In the end, we will close out the 
chapter with an interesting and defying reality of whether firms should behave 
prosocially and achieve profit based on that investment, all in the perspective of 
consumers. 
The data sources used were initially indexed from researching academic 
materials based on key terms such as nudge applications in private firms, 
behavioral influencers, impact of prosocial investments, nudging for good, and 
consumer’s reaction/expectation on prosocial firms. These terms were applied 
mainly applied in Google, while Católica Porto Business School’s online 
business search interface library provided a few of the older articles, and 
Google Scholar was scarcely used. Topics covered in the Literature Review had 
been collected during the specialized course in behavioral influencers in college 
and started from the most prominent authors of the field, and development 
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went through sources used by those authors. Research done in the most recent 
years was selected considering the relevance of the methodology used by 
authors and their knowledge of previous literature. Data utilized here was all 
secondary as an experiment was not possible due to time and financial 
restraints. Overall the majority of this data is quantitative as we conclude based 
on statistical outcomes of previously observed behavior compared to traditional 
techniques. While in small quantities, some pieces of information will be 
qualitative as the authors discussed their experiments on both statistical 
evidence, but also on consumer’s opinions through interviews and focus 
groups. 
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Chapter 1 
Behavioral Economics 
1. An Introduction on Behavioral Economics 
One of the requirements to understand behavioral economics is that it stands 
against several classic concepts such as perfect rationality, in the sense that 
people could act such as machines capable of perfect mathematically supported 
decisions. Behavioral economics respects bounded rationality and states that 
people are somewhat irrational (Dan Ariely, 2009). This notion acknowledges 
that the overload of information alongside with cognitive constraints lead to 
imperfect decision making. However, not being capable of following the lines of 
neoclassic rationality does not make people ignorant, it makes them human. 
Through observed behavior, rationality is explained as a reality influenced by 
the individual’s limitations. In behavioral economics, rationality isn’t a law of 
decision-making, but it is the reality observed when individuals act upon 
information through their cognitive skills in hopes to maximize wellbeing. Just 
as Ariely states in his YouTube presentation, “What Is Behavioral Economics”, 
the starting point of both theories is different. “Rather than assuming people are 
rational, and then taking the implications of that, we have [in Behavioral 
Economics] no prior belief. Let’s just see how people behave (…) and then as a 
consequence let’s make the implications”. Only then, since people often don’t 
behave rationally, the implications are different from those of standard 
economics (Dan Ariely, 2011). 
Standard economics assumes selfish behavior through a self-interested 
perspective as the means to rational behavior, but behavioral economics 
describes human behavior as produced based on social interaction, and with 
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social awareness of the other’s needs. As Baddeley (2017) states, humans have 
social preferences, such as disliking inequality. People also learn from that 
social interaction, they are not fully informed ex-ante a decision is made, but the 
decision differs if new pieces of information are found. If we see two local pubs, 
one with a long queue and the other with no queue, we will believe those 
people have some type of information that we do not, thus making us join the 
populated queue. Even if previous information leads us to believe the other bar 
was preferred, our preference has changed based on the evidence we 
extrapolate (Baddeley, 2017). 
Another way behavioral economics adds value to the existing rational choice 
theory, comes from intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Money is not the only 
intrinsic motivation, nor the only extrinsic one. Other motivations such as 
punishment avoidance and personal sake are of importance as well. Intrinsic 
criteria such as pride and the feeling of success show us how much more 
complex measuring utility it is. This is due to the existence of several other 
motivations, but also due to the tough time it is to calculate pride in a 
mathematical equation. 
Sometimes decisions aren’t pondered at all, they can be impulsive, quick, not 
deliberated enough, and eventually badly prepared. We are limited by multiple 
choices, information excess, time constraints, among other barriers that prevent 
us from executing rational choices as neoclassic economics describes. The fact 
that individuals must use quick thinking in a crowded environment, will bring 
into account heuristics to simplify cognitive processes. To cope with so many 
barriers, these heuristics will shorten the time and complexity it takes to decide, 
whether enhancing the decision, or undermining it. 
Standard economics does not identify individuals’ lack of ability to assessing 
risky behavior, as Kahneman and Tversky have proven, where various 
irregularities were shown to exist in equal scenarios among several participants 
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(Kahneman, 2011). Alongside the fact that individual differences are neglected 
in classic economics, such as personality, behavioral economics follows an 
increased microeconomic perspective. In respect to the interdependence of 
individuals, their personality traits, the learning processes that root from being 
social animals, this whole dimension has an aggregation problem: individuals 
cannot be added up to the whole population, such as standard economic 
theories have done (Baddeley, 2017). 
2. Prosocial importance and policy makers 
In 2014’s OECD Regulatory Policy and Behavioral Economics authored by 
Pete Lunn, several examples of successful nudging techniques, a branch of 
behavioral economics, were tested through randomized controlled trials, and 
later applied in the UK. The UK’s Behavioral Insights Team called by Her 
Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service, developed a nudge that helped resolve 
fine collection delays. The issue regarded payments not being executed during 
their penalty-free period. The technique carried out in the RCT was based on a 
suggestion made by Garner in 2005. By starting a communications program to 
connect with the users to incentive them to pay on time, customized text 
messages were proven to be most effective with fine defaulters, comparing to 
other forms of communication. Bringing a reduced cost to policy makers, a 
simple personalized message increased early payment and reduced further 
punishment (Lunn, 2014). 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in “Nudge”, wrote how policy makers can 
apply nudges to change behavior. One of the main examples, that derives of a 
wide capability, is the option of defaults (R Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). When 
nothing is specified, the pre-set option will take effect. These are most effective 
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when there is uncertainty, or inertia during the decision-making process 
(Cheema & Soman, 2008). One example is the increase in donation rates when 
individuals are faced with an opt-out decision rather than an opt-in choice 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
3. Behavioral Economics application 
In Misbehaving, Richard Thaler starts with an iteration he tested while 
teaching microeconomics. After an exam given to the class’ participants, where 
the average achieved 72 points out of 100, students were very upset at the 
grade. Usually, grades were given in an alphabetic correlation to the numbers, 
such as B+, or B. The grade of 72 matched the average B/B+, but students clearly 
didn’t feel it was the same. The following exam now had a maximum mark of 
137 for two reasons. One, the previous average of 72 points would be written on 
the exam as a numeric value of 96. The second reason is that dividing their 
actual mark over 137 is an arduous task, so converting to a percentage would 
seem an uninteresting task. The result showed how students felt better about 
their new results, even though the average was 70%, lower than the previous 
72%. As Thaler states, “to an economist, no one should be happier about a score 
of 96 out of 137 (70%) than 72 out of 100, but my students were. And by 
realizing this, I was able to set the kind of exam I wanted but still keep the 
students from grumbling” (R H Thaler, 2015).  
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4. Cognitive biases 
Whenever choices are made, biases are in effect. In many cases, we are 
unaware of being under influence. It is based on our cognitive incapability to 
process all the existent information that we generate decision errors. “The word 
cognition stands for all the reasoning processes in the human mind, regardless 
of whether they are fully conscious or not” (Selten, 1998). Cognitive biases are 
the resulting factor of “unconscious errors of reasoning that distort our 
judgement of the world”(Kahneman, 2011). 
In “The Paradox of Choice”, Barry Schwartz (2004) shows how a variable 
such as amount of possible choices, can have a negative outcome for the 
decision. Stating that “as the number of options increases, the psychological 
stakes rise accordingly”, Schwartz identifies psychological complications that 
origin from increased product availability (Schwartz, 2004). 
On another example, Sheena Iyengar (1995) conducted a study with “Wilkin 
& Sons” jam where she displayed separately: two selections of product were 
used, one selection consisting of 24 jams, and another consisting of 6 jams, both 
available for consumers to purchase. While only 40% of participants preferred 
the 6 jams section, 30% of these participants showed interest in buying some. 
While in the 60% group that was attracted by the wide array of jams, only 3% 
showed intent of purchase (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 
Biases are more complex in terms of awareness than it is perceived. We 
might have freedom to choose, but our choice is heavily affected by factors 
prior, or even during purchase. An interesting technique described by Schwartz 
in the same book, as “missed opportunities”, is also a common economic 
concept of opportunity cost. The author adds to this concept of measuring 
hypothetical trade-offs as economic theory states, that consumers gauge choices 
based on missed opportunities instead of the opportunity’s potential. This is a 
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case where during the decision-making we overcomplicate variables based on 
the wide array of choices available. Prior to purchase, efforts such as adverts led 
by firms, link products to the “place” of the marketing mix, looking to reduce 
this level of bias and assert early preference. They look to place their products 
characteristics on top of our mind, as to make choice easier for us in preferring 
their product. However, it is not as simple as a dichotomic to prefer or not 
prefer the product that is shown in the ad. 
Our preferences are also under impact of other decision variables. While 
consumption may look to grant us an emotion after consumption, emotions 
themselves surface at times of deliberation, prior to consumption even. 
Neuroscientists Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio Damasio 
hypothesize that besides outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence, 
emotional quality is also present in the decision-making process. The damage 
that results from this quality of emotions prior to the decision, such as the 
emotions that arise during the time we take processing an ad, “leads to 
pathological impairments in the decision-making process which seriously 
compromise the efficiency of everyday-life decisions” (Bechara, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 2000). We are now able to understand that our locus of control might 
need internal strength adaptation. 
This psychology concept is also used in consumer research. A study done by 
Narasimhan Srinivasan and Surinder Tikoo (1992), both from the University of 
Connecticut, examined the locus of control on external search for information 
on 1401 new car buyers. They concluded that internal locus engages “in a 
greater degree of information search compared to externals” (Srinivasan & 
Tikoo, 1992). 
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5. Bounded Rationality 
The reason our decision-making is constantly under pressure can begin to be 
explained by our bounded rationality. Herbert A. Simon coined the term that 
does not follow a rigid definition, but is “a problem that needs to be explored” 
(Gigerenzer, 2000). “Bounded rationality is understood as rationality exhibited 
by actual human economic behavior” (Selten, 1998).The origin of this concept 
does not state that individuals are irrational. Instead, since optimization of 
choice is an immense task, no enough individual effort can deal with countless 
choices. This concept is a psychological pillar of behavioral economics (Abbott 
et al., 2016).  
However, optimization isn’t always at play, as consumers look for 
“satisficing” instead of maximizing. This term merges satisfaction and 
sufficiency, as individuals reach a decision considering their costs and 
constraints, and not a complete optimization of choice. Satisficing individuals 
tend to choose options that will meet basic criteria for choice (Simon, 1956).  
On another perspective, neoclassic economics states that non-maximization 
actions are irrational and have no space for good practice. Not only neoclassic 
economics is contradicting with Behavioral Economics. By linking Simon’s 
suffice theory with the current bounded rationality concept, we find similar 
conflict since sufficing theory if based on solely two levels, satisfaction and 
sufficiency, and that only these two are required to explain decisions that are 
not in the maximization spectrum. However, other elements such as cognitive 
bias also push individuals away from optimization.  
Still on this line of thought, as stated in Gigerenzer’s book, an individual 
who is “guided by aspiration adaptation rather than utility maximization may 
be perfectly rational”. Using his example of chess, a game where the rules and 
goals are easily understood, explicit, and not subject to change, several 
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conditions emerge to cripple the players decisions, proven by a lack of perfect 
optimal strategy. Reasons such as “multiple competing goals”, 
“incommensurable goals”, or that alternatives are not known and require 
lengthy research throughout the process, highlight how optimization is 
impossible. This is due to the size and multitude of variables such as number 
and impact of moving set pieces which negates complete control and 
predictability, but also due to the non-finite choice set available during the 
game (Gigerenzer, 2000).  
Selten explains how incommensurable goals cannot be weighted by 
optimization models, but bounded rationality can. His example is an archer 
who is trying to hit the trunk of the tree with an arrow shot from his bow. If the 
arrow missed to the left-side of the trunk, the archer either aims it more to the 
right, or tries the same shot expecting external variables to change, such as 
wind. In reality, there are more than two variables at play besides where the 
archer aims to and the wind.  
Factors such as focus, the height of the archer, gravity itself, and many 
others, negate the possibility for the archer to make a choice based on all 
available pieces of information. Therefore, choice is made based on the 
bounded rationality of the archer. He is only aware and can only control a 
limited number of variables, and as such will act upon then. Since his goal is to 
hit the trunk of the tree with an arrow, maximization is met by reaching this 
goal.  
However, there is a lack of perfect optimal strategy, as variables are too 
many. If he were to look for a perfect optimal strategy before firing the arrow, 
he would have never done it, because he would never control all variables 
needed to fire the arrow perfectly, thus never reaching maximization of choice, 
which would be hitting the trunk. Based on a limited amount of them, the 
archer is now capable of firing the arrow, which he might hit or not, but based 
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on his learning system, he can now hit the tree (Selten, 1998). This example aids 
understanding how bounded rationality may bring an optimal outcome. 
In this sense where an overload of information exists but little is processed, 
decision-makers can be influenced by many factors, such as biases. As 
Haselton, Nettle, and Andrews (2005) state, in the cases where biases are 
experienced, inferences and beliefs adopted have inadequate logical basis for 
their existence (Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2015). To cope with said 
limitations from our bounded rationality, decision-makers use a crutch. This 
support comes from the use of heuristics. The mere existence of common sense 
is a valuable tool to reach a goal, and a heuristic. In this case, it is an ability to 
make intelligent decisions based on daily occurrences. Through a judgment 
based on the “imagination of hypothetical sense presentation”(Schutz, 1972), 
individuals share a common value judgement over situations that lead them to 
better decisions. 
6. Duality of Systems 
As Sloman (1996) describes, earlier developments of distinctive models of 
thought process dated back to Aristoteles. The challenge behind a duality of 
systems comes from the difficulty of defining two systems “in a precise, 
empirically consequential way”, and describing how and when these two work 
together (Sloman, 1996). James, earlier in the 20th century, described two 
computational methods as being of association, and the other one being 
symbolic.  
The first system is based on trains of imagery which “often reveal 
intermediating links of perfect naturalness and propriety”, where these show 
structure between correlations of images (James, 1950). The second one is based 
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on a rule-system, where the fundaments of this computational mechanic such 
as the productivity of this system rely, and through which we can encode an 
unrestricted number of suggestions.  
Considering more recent development, characteristics such as imagery 
association are kept. Tversky and Kahneman acknowledge the existence of two 
parts of the thought process, calling them System 1 and System 2. System 1 
relates to instinctive, immediate, low to none effort, automatic thought process. 
It is executed when we make simple math that we have memorized from our 
earlier days of school, such as 2+2. System 2 can utilize the input from System 1, 
and is a controllable, demanding, conscious, reliable, not error prone like the 
other system.  
This serves as basis for the development of this thesis, as it aids 
understanding which system will be affected and activated through the 
decision-making. A cognitive bias will affect System 1’s judgement, which will 
then feed System 2 with biased input (Kahneman & Tversky, 2011). 
Since we can train our System 2 in order to react to the information given by 
System 1, mechanisms such as heuristics exist to aid our System 2 to process 
what is the produce of System 1. These and other tools have been an adaptation 
of the amount of data System 1 observes, which cannot fully be handled by 
System 2. 
7. Heuristics 
One of the better known and common mechanisms used to aid System 2’s 
thought-process are called heuristics. A heuristic is a strategy that simplifies 
decisions, decreasing their difficulty to perform. As Kahneman notes, decision-
makers switch a difficult question with an easier one (Kahneman, 2003). They 
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are cognitive shortcuts, whether through “criteria, methods, or principles” that 
decide between alternative courses of action, hoping to find the most effective 
path to achieving a goal. “Heuristics play an effective role in such problems by 
indicating a way to reduce the number of evaluations and to obtain solutions 
within reasonable time constraints” (Pearl, 1984). It may be a rule of thumb or a 
cognitive shortcut that guides individual’s actions. Analyzing Harry 
Markowitz’s work and 1990’s Nobel Prize in Economics for his theoretical work 
on optimal asset allocation, Gerd Gigerenzer displays how the prized economist 
utilizes heuristics instead of proven optimization processes.  
He states there is an adaptive mental toolbox where we decide upon logic, 
probability, or heuristics to aid our assessment. But he states and quotes earlier 
studies where logic applications “have been absolutely fruitless” and that 
probability theory depicts individuals as the “intuitive statiscian” that manages 
to preform risky “bets” rather than “deducing true consequences from 
assumptions”. The third tool available in our toolbox would be heuristics. They 
might not find the optimal solution as they aren’t capable of maximizing a 
function, but they help choose the first option that satisfices, the one “that 
exceeds an aspiration level”(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). 
One of the main differences between Gigerenzer and Kahneman is the result 
of using a heuristic. While Kahneman believes it aids the decision-making 
process by reducing difficulty and time needed to choose, it may not always 
bring a positive outcome. Comparing to a situation where we could digest all 
existing information, heuristics do help reach conclusions, but may not reach a 
better conclusion than if we were to use all available information. Gigerenzer 
on the other hand does state that heuristics on our toolbox will always bring a 
“suffice” outcome. He does mention however that even though a heuristic 
might not achieve maximization of outcome, as it does not follow a 
maximization formula, it will always bring a positive result for the individual.   
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Back to Markowitz, he answered how people should optimally invest on N 
assets. He proved there is an optimal portfolio that maximizes the return and at 
the same time minimizes the risk. Being a specialist on the topic, he still did not 
use that strategy for his retirement investments. Instead, he used a heuristic of 
investing in the 1/N rule, where he invested equally on each of N funds. As 
Gigerenzer points out, in 2006, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2006) 
concluded that none of their 12 optimal asset policies being tested out against 
the 1/N rule, could actually beat it (DeMiguel et al., 2006). With this example, 
we identify that even specialists utilize heuristics.  
Other examples of identified heuristics come from Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
recognized two heuristics in 1996 and 2002, as being the “take the best” and 
“recognition” heuristic, respectively. The first one is developed in deeper extent 
as it approaches choice through three separate steps, as to “infer which of two 
alternatives has the higher value by (a) searching through cues in order of 
validity, (b) stopping the search as soon as a cue discriminates, (c) choosing the 
alternative this cue favors” (Gigerenzer, 2008). The original work done in 1996 
develops these phases further. This heuristic is “ecologically rational” in cases 
where information is scarce, when there is moderate to high redundancy of 
cues based on the level of discrimination a cue might bring, and where cue 
validities vary highly, being these cues’ validity symbolism of predictive power 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1996).  
The other heuristic identified by these authors, the recognition heuristic, is 
another example of “ecologically rational heuristics”, which is rooted in 
psychological capabilities that humans have developed, such as memory. 
Before explaining the recognition heuristic, let’s see what ecological rationality 
is. It is the “match between mind and environment. This analysis includes the 
coevolution of heuristics and environments”. It helps determine the 
environmental structures where a heuristic is successful (Gigerenzer, 2008). 
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Based on Simon’s emphasis on recognition memory and limited search as 
preparatory steps for decision-making, Gigerenzer and Goldstein identify a 
technique of exploiting “potential information in a lack of recognition”, as to 
model-inferences from memory. These authors, based on Ulrich Hoffrage’s 
dissertation, lead to the formulation of the recognition heuristic. The 
dissertation was first done in 1995, but now it is described in the edition of 2011 
(Hoffrage, 2011). Hoffrage conducted a study consisting of two sets of questions 
for German students. Both questions asked the population of a city, but one set 
had American cities and the other set had German cities. The predicted 
outcome, as the author states, would be that German students had more 
knowledge of their countries’ cities. However, the conclusion of the test brought 
better results for American cities’ population guesses. This supports the 
previously existent “Less-is-More” effect, but now applied to the recognition 
heuristic, where “familiarity” is a probabilistic cue. This heuristic made German 
students believe that American cities, compared to the German cities, probably 
had less population, due to having less memory recognition. If we extrapolate 
this data to products, consumers will infer that a recognizable product will 
appear to be of higher value in a certain criteria, than an unrecognized one (D. 
G. Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
Heuristics can improve decision-making and even outperform specialized 
decisions, such as the one involving the German students. In a study where 
individuals with lack of recognition of tennis as a sport and tennis tournaments 
were asked about the outcomes of Wimbledon tennis tournaments, participants 
ranked equal or higher than the official ATP Rankings’ predictions, all based on 
player recognition. The ecological rationality behind the recognition heuristic 
present in this trial, formulates a triad of connections between the criterion 
(player success), the mediator (newspapers), and the participants recognition. It 
follows a natural flow of information where we absorb data from media, we 
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generate opinions on the criteria, and then this criterion influences the media, 
which once again feeds us the information. The newspapers influenced 
participants with the players and competition’s information of a past time. 
These participants would then infer about the players’ success, which is the 
criterion (Scheibehenne & Bröder, 2007). 
On the other hand, heuristics can also bias consumers. Anuj Shah and Daniel 
Oppenheimer established a framework based on effort-reduction, where 
heuristics are labelled and ranked by the amount of effort they can reduce when 
decisions are made. They state that heuristics will result in one or several 
methods of effort-reduction, such as examining fewer cues, simplifying the 
weight principles of said queues, or even considering less alternatives, among 
others. What results from this process may not just be a positive outcome for 
consumers (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). The price heuristic is an everyday 
example of this reality. The observation we make of a product might not match 
its reality, such as the relationship between quality and price. However, 
perceived quality has been linked to monetary price. If our perception of 
quality increases or decreases, it will affect our perception of expected price. 
The same happens the other way around, as the price heuristic “suggests that 
people judge expensive products to be of high quality” (Mitra, 1995 apud Shah 
& Oppenheimer, 2008). If a new product enters the market, and we have no 
informational cues about it, besides their shelf price, we will relate that product 
with similar ones we have seen in the past, and based on those products’ prices, 
we will define quality based on the newcomer’s price. This said, if a low-cost 
product presents itself with a high price, we would be at risk of making a bad 
decision in case we wanted a high-quality product. The same risk exists if we 
saw the low-cost product being similar to a high-cost one and inferred the same 
associations onto the low-cost one as we had about the high-cost example. 
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Heuristics are simple, solution-seeking mechanisms, but if they fail to 
achieve a correct assertion, they can result in cognitive bias as we are capable of 
understanding now. When heuristics are applied, there is a “relative neglect of 
other considerations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). If this neglect leads to 
violations of formal logic or judgement deviation from what would be the 
perspective of accepted norms, it is a bias (Dan Ariely, 2009). An example given 
by Kahneman shows how a heuristic can lead to a systematic mistake. Think 
about words starting with “r” or words with “r” as the third letter. People think 
there are more words starting with “r” than as the third letter. However, the 
latter is more common in English. This happens since words starting with an 
“r” are easier to remember (Kahneman & Tversky, 2011). This is the availability 
heuristic. Information that we immediately recall will deem to be better and of 
more importance than any other we are taking time to remember (Esgate, 
Groome, & Baker, 2005).  
 
7.1 Default 
There are plenty more examples of heuristics, such as defaults. In computer 
science, a default is an automatic selection of a pre-determined computational 
value in absence of a choice made by the user (“default” 2017). This definition is 
respected by behavioral sciences, and further deduction is made. Experiments 
have concluded that a default option has a higher likelihood of being made, 
compared to a scenario without a default situation for said option. In 2004, 
Johnson and Goldstein, asked 161 home buyers to resolve a simple issue 
whether to be a donor or not in their new town. In both cases of default, opting-
in or -out, the results were relative to the default option. If it was opt-in, the 
percentage was almost half of the opt-out. The difference was of fourty 
percentage points. A larger difference was noted as opt-out countries such as 
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Austria and Hungary showed, in that year, close to 100% consent rates. Those 
that did not, such as Denmark and Germany, were below the 15% mark 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2004). This is called a default effect, or the status quo 
bias. Looking at the causes of these default effects, recommendation as a form 
of communication and implied endorsement from policy makers, does 
influence decision-making. If the individual trusts, or supports their 
governmental entity, they are highly likely to stick with the default. If the 
contrary occurs, where disapproval exists toward the policy maker, the default 
is undesirable (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). Another reason for 
defaults comes from the cognitive effort that is attempted to minimize during a 
decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 2011; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Factors 
such as level of involvement (Clarke & Belke, 1979), the recurrence of a decision 
(Hoyer, 1984), the complexity of the decision, or the lack of awareness of an 
actual choice at stake (C. L. Brown & Krishna, 2004) are also variables that help 
explain the cognitive effort behind decisions. A fourth concept that aids 
explaining status quo effects, is the weight of meaning behind opting in or out. 
An experiment in America lead by Cornell University, highlighted how opt-in 
situations find an altruistic action of high value, and thus are very sensitive to 
that action. Whereas opt-out countries find the same action to be of less value, 
or sacrifice, as participants showed a lower level of sensitivity to the same 
altruistic action this time around (Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2012). 
7.2 Frame 
In 1991, Kahneman and Tversky, explained how individuals would rather 
avoid losses than gain equal gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This reality 
describes loss aversion. We approach it here to showcase how biases can 
influence one another. In the next example, loss aversion can be influenced by 
another bias, called framing. By presenting an amount as savings, or the same 
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amount as avoiding surcharge, consumers on average prefer the first option, 
being under the effect of a frame (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). There may 
be several heuristics weighting in on our decisions simultaneously, and these 
two, default and framing, are examples of this reality. 
Kühberger corroborated the framing effect on risky decisions. Through 
compilation of “136 empirical papers that reported framing experiments with 
nearly 30,000 participants, we calculated 230 effect sizes”, leading to the 
confirmation that framing indeed affects risk-related decisions, whether they 
had small or moderately sized consequences (Kühberger, 1998).  
Kahneman and Tversky tested two types of equivalency regarding gains or 
losses. Having into account prospect theory, their experiment was the famous 
Asian disease framing problem. In the first set, two “gain” options were 
presented to participants, where, in a sample of overall 600 victims, they could 
choose to save 200 people, and another option with probability of 1/3 of saving 
everyone, and 2/3 of saving no one. The one with most responses was option A, 
to instantly save 200 people. While both outcomes have the same expected 
utility of saving 200 victims, option A was preferred. 
On the second set of testing, two “loss” options were presented. In the first 
option, participants choose to kill 400 victims. Option B would be to not kill 
anyone with a probability of 1/3, or to kill everyone with a probability of 2/3. 
Once again expected utility is the same but this time the preferred option was 
the latter, option B. 
Framing does influence interpretation and response as the previous example 
shows. For both options in each set, expected utility is the same, but it is also 
equivalent in the other set. This means that in both experiments the expected 
utility was the same, but instead of stating 200 people would survive, the 
authors framed the other set as 400 people would die (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984). 
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8. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory is a behavioral model describing decisions under risk. By 
analyzing alternatives and their levels of risk and uncertainty, the model aids 
understanding how people think of utility relative to a reference point. The 
rational choice as Rational Choice Theory dictates, would be to consider 
absolute outcomes, and not the comparison to the reference point. By framing 
risky options, decision-makers showcase risk-averse or risk-seeking behavior, 
based on their expectations. This concept, published in 1979 by Tversky and 
Kahneman, identifies biased weighting of probabilities. Through a 
mathematical example utilizing framing heuristics, gains/losses and high/low 
probabilities are compared between one another to determine risk-seeking or 
risk-averse behavior.  
In an experiment regarding probabilities and analyzing risk-behavior, two 
options were presented to participants. Option A granted them $2,500 with 
probability of 0.33, $2,400 with probability of 0.66, and $0 with probability of 
0.01. Option B granted $2,400 with certainty. The first option has a higher 
expected utility but 82% of participants preferred option B. The justification 
behind such behavior is explained through the overweighting of losses’ 
probability.  
The authors conclude that besides biased weighting, individuals are also loss 
averse as they are willing to take risks in hopes to avoid loss (Kahneman, 2003). 
9. Behavioral Economics and Rational Choice Theory 
As cognitive biases exist, and knowing they lead to systematic bias behind 
our decision-making, the utility-maximizing individual as described by rational 
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choice theory must be revised. As Mathis and colleagues note, the homo 
oeconomicus will “make decisions that neither serve their own interests nor 
maximize social welfare” (Mathis, Steffen, Mathis, & Steffen, 2015). Instead of 
looking at what rational choice theory dictates as consumers being selfish, 
maximizing, and self-centered, behavioral economics observes actual behavior 
and seeks to predict future decisions. As Mathis and colleagues explain, 
behavioral economics critiques rational choice theory’s axioms. Herbert Simon 
did explain how the assumptions of perfect rationality contradict reality, as 
they lacked the capability to describe actual behavior under complex 
circumstances. The utility function behind rational choice theory is devaluated 
by Kahneman and Tversky’s work. Based on empirical evidence, individuals 
usually are risk averse, and may base their decisions on arbitrary criteria, such 
as heuristics. Not only do they make decisions under different assessments, but 
they also process information differently, as System 1 and System 2 theory 
explains. While rational choice theory focuses on System 2’s process, behavioral 
economics focuses on overcoming the influences we are under during System 
1’s process. In Mathis’ work, cognitive biases “lead people to take decisions 
which maximize neither their own nor social utility”.  
On the other hand, behavioral economics is also criticized for the exposure it 
gives for “rampant exploitation by business of consumer psychology” while 
surfacing information that leads to further abuse, as “consumers are easily 
manipulated by sellers into making bad choices” (Peltzman, 2013). Several 
pieces of academia lead to the complementarity of both theories. Taking the 
example of volunteer work, rational choice theory requires aid from behavioral 
theory to apply their exchange theory. There are obstacles in defining utilitarian 
calculus besides hours invested and income lost. Aspects such as the social 
skills of interacting with other people, and organizing own’s work, are not 
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considered by rational choice theory, but behavioral economics acknowledges 
their existence and includes them in explaining behavior (Wilson, 2000).  
 
 
Chapter 2 
Nudging 
The father of behavioral theory, Richard Thaler, has showed how biases, 
heuristics, and fallacies lead to decisions that deviate from the classic rationality 
expectation. In “Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics”, 
conciliating behavioral economics with prospect theory from Kahneman and 
Tversky, the neoclassic concept of rationality is put into scrutiny and the limits 
of rationality are questioned. The basis of behavioral economics focuses on the 
effect that several factors in the decision-making architecture such as 
psychological, cognitive, emotional and other internal or external influences, 
such as institutions, have on the decision-making process. This is done without 
labelling an observed behavior as “irrational” or “rational” as neoclassic theory 
dictates. By analyzing its causes, objectives, and actual decision-making to 
reach said goals, individual behavior can be better explained and predicted 
than before. Ariely shows an example where people do not behave in a rational 
way. By asking several lawyers to defend the cases of a group of people in 
need, two situations were tested. In one, they were offered $30 to represent the 
group. In this case, they all rejected. Classic economics states that money being 
the regular outcome of their job, these lawyers should have accepted if they 
believe the amount is proportionate to the work effort. However, the second 
group of lawyers were asked to do it for free, and this time around, almost all of 
them agreed to do so. This time they were getting paid $0 to perform the same 
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service as the $30 offer. Behavioral economics is capable of identifying other 
reasons besides quantitative measures such as money, but also qualitative such 
as social norms or hedonic motives (Dan Ariely, 2009; Small & Cryder, 2016). 
By having its basis of study on psychology, and placing individual and 
institutional behavior under scrutiny, behavioral economics can start off where 
neoclassic economics ends. Weintraub stated that neoclassical economics bases 
itself on the three assumptions of rational behavior. These are that individuals 
and firms maximize utility to the fullest, that people will only act upon 
acknowledging all pieces of information available and deducing an optimal 
decision based on the full knowledge given by the available information, and at 
last, that people have rational rankings and preferences between outcomes that 
are associated with values of their own. In the end, the method with which 
individuals utilize scarce resources is the definition of neoclassic economics 
itself, maximizing utility based on limited available resources (Weintraub, 
1993). However, behavioral economics critiques these axioms, as individuals 
are not labelled rational or irrational if they step inside or outside of neoclassic 
economics’ limits. Behavioral theory demonstrates how the boundaries of 
rationality are not so strictly defined, by respecting people’s bounded 
rationality. When decision-makers disrupt the self-centrism and egoism that 
neoclassic theory defends as being irrational, behavioral economics approaches 
this observation as an explainable rationality. “The fields [of neoclassical 
economic theory] are primarily concerned with the rationality, or lack thereof, 
of economic agents” (D. Goldstein, 2005).If an individual shares income with 
someone else without getting anything on the levels of physical or 
physiological utility back, neoclassic economics clearly states this decision as 
irrational. On the other hand, behavioral economics looks to examine the 
possible reasons for such conduct. In the end, if the individual does find 
pleasure in sharing income, even though they are sacrificing the money earned 
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through a day’s work, and ultimately also sacrificing irrecuperable time, their 
decision-making is studied and explained by behavioral scientists as capable of 
being rational.  
Stepping into the realm of behavioral analysis, decision-makers don’t rule 
their lives solely based on pre-defined rules of behavior such as the neoclassic 
axioms. They are not predictable based on fixed rules of economics or acting as 
robots that seek out their own interest to the fullest even if that means to 
discard others. Behavioral economics picks up the outcome of said decision and 
backward-analyzes it to find the real reasons behind those actions. The 
objective is to find the tacit psychological elements that lead to that end 
behavior. Why do individuals sacrifice revenue to distribute it to others, if they 
earned it for themselves? It is this whole field of apparent irrationality that 
behavioral economics develops its cause. Instead of defining rational decisions 
as doing A or doing B, behavioral economics seeks information on why some 
individuals go for A, and why others go for B. Sometimes maximizing utility 
isn’t the reason behind choice, it might not be the mathematical decision of 
subtracting the cons from the pros. Choice may come based on other 
influencers, and these are not present in classic economics. Behavioral 
economics looks to improve neo-classic theory through application of 
psychology, thus including other concepts through observation (D. Goldstein, 
2005). 
This said, decision-making is no longer a clear mathematical calculation 
based on machine-like behavior. It is a complex equation that often leads 
individuals to mistakes, as they do not control all its variables. These mistakes 
can be learnt, or avoided, whether by personal development, or with the 
support of public policy. A phenomenon that influences behavior through 
respecting the freedom to choose while persuading the individual to take one 
path, is called a nudge. Coined by Thaler and Sunstein, it represents the push 
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that applied to individuals or firms, will alter their behavior in a prosocial 
manner. Do not confuse this with suppression or restraint, as it does not violate 
one’s ability and freedom to choose any other path, it just nudges them to choose 
a better one (R Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Based on Tversky’s contributions, 
Laibson and Zeckhauser define behavioral economics as follows, “this field, 
skeptical of perfect rationality, emphasizes validation of modeling assumptions, 
integration of micro-level data on decisions (including experimental evidence), 
and adoption of lessons from psychology” (Laibson & Zeckhauser, 1998). 
The focus of this thesis is on this instrument that increased the field-of-view 
on the analysis of consumption. Economics has always sought to predict 
consumer activity, and behavioral economics runs toward the same goal. Based 
on experiments of real-life observation, documenting both unbiased and 
conditioned behavior through RCT trials for example, conclusions are then 
extracted. This conduct is not later generalized after being proven, but rather 
applied and tested for other possible scenarios. After analyzing practical 
conduct, only then is theory generated, and not the other way around. In 
nudging, theory is found by observing behavior and experimenting if it can be 
influenced without restricting individuals.  
This technique was introduced by previous authors but formalized by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. In “Nudge: improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness”, published in early 2008, concepts such as 
libertarian paternalism were introduced to help describe the idea of a nudge. A 
nudge is essentially a strategy where intention is made into action, by 
respecting individual freedom, but also influencing behavior in a non-
controlling way. The pioneer J. Wilk, in 1999, described a nudge as a 
microtargeted strategy focused on a precise group of individuals. However, 
nudging theory only gained major attention after Thaler and Sunstein 
approached in depth the capabilities of a nudge. Based on the success of 
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behavioral economics, the Behavioral Insights Team was created in the United 
Kingdom, or “Nudge Unit”, and during that same period the United States of 
America. included nudging theory in public policy through the White House’s 
Social and Behavioral Science Team (SBST). In the same book, Thaler and 
Sunstein do develop on necessary traits or assumptions for a technique to be 
called a nudge. Alongside indirect suggestion, an intuitive concept of 
libertarian paternalism is needed in the construction of a nudge.  As Thaler and 
Sunstein defined, nudges form “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the 
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. 
Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not” (R 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
The main pillar of a nudge is libertarian paternalism. It represents the 
grounded respect and freedom given to the recipient of the nudge, the nudgee 
so to speak. Even though policy makers might know what is best for the 
population, information and conditioners of action are molded and simplified 
for individuals to act upon. However, they are not forced to follow what the 
nudge proposes. This concept of libertarian paternalism is the coalition of 
freedom and paternalism. The goal of the notion “should be to avoid random, 
arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is likely to promote 
people's welfare” (Richard Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). The young offspring 
listens to guidance from its parents, but then is faced with the option to follow 
said guidance, act against it, or act indifferently to it. A nudge is an instrument 
that increases the odds of the child acting according to the parental help. Same 
idea applies to governments. They know smoking causes illness and affects 
more people than the individual, so they showcase the resulting problems of 
regular smoking on the tobacco packaging. The imagery and text content does 
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provide enlightenment. But it does not forcefully change behavior, nor does it 
increase it. A successful nudge must not risk the negative attribute of occurring 
more than before.  
Through positive reinforcement, consequence is linked to action, by 
highlighting how a suggested act will lead to a coveted outcome. Not only must 
it not increase negative behavior as we have talked about before, but it must 
lead to an increase in the positive behavior. If no change happens whatsoever, 
the nudge is ineffective. 
To conclude this part of the theory, we started off by setting the boundaries 
of rationality as not being stiff, clear-cut rules, as the neoclassic theory states. By 
knowing we must observe actual human behavior, nudging will be tested 
through experimentation to check if it will bring conclusive evidence on 
whether it could, or not, be applied. These nudging techniques look to reach a 
better outcome than historical techniques, while also being a cost-effective 
intervention. 
We have seen before how policy makers can better handle deficits such as 
lack of organ donations with a simple technique of opt-out for those donations. 
Nudges have been tested for several prosocial programs such as drug program 
adherence. We have seen examples of these before, and now we will investigate 
nudging techniques on another perspective, and that will be of for-profit firms. 
One of the most famous cases linked with prosocial activity is TOMS, which 
also improved several key metrics for them, consequence of their social 
responsibility. 
The case of TOMS shoes is a well-known “business of giving” as M. 
Zimmerman described the business model. They are a Californian designer and 
retailer of shoes, among other apparel and accessories. Their “one-for-one” 
social enterprise movement was generated to make what David Lauren, which 
has previously worked together with TOMS, states to be “the appeal to the 
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consumer is that when you buy something, you feel connected to something 
that matters” (Binkley, 2010). This business model gifts a pair of shoes to an 
impoverished child for each pair of shoes bought at TOMS. So far, since 2005, 
TOMS has donated over 75 million of pairs, information available in their 
website, late July. The way the business works is through four main steps. The 
first one is the purchase from the consumer, which then signals the TOMS 
Giving Team with their Giving Partners to plan how and where the pair of 
shoes will be distributed to. After contact is met with the Giving Partners, 
TOMS is capable of adapting products with tailored offerings through services, 
logistics, local production and other measures to locals. The last step connects 
the Partners to the beneficiaries of the shoes, where TOMS maintains a level of 
support that spills over to other dimensions that the firm also focus on, such as 
preventing bullying, giving support on areas such as eyewear, child birth, and 
clean water. Future monitoring of the program is also assured and uploaded to 
their media pages. 
TOMS philanthropic endeavors such as their partnership with “charity: 
water”, which brings clean water to underdeveloped areas, are not dependent 
on the level of sales. TOMS have their own Water Forward project with the 
same goal (Ferenstein, 2011). 
TOMS “one-for-one” business has been an example of a for-profit, socially 
responsible company, that inspired other replicas such as Bombas, and One 
World Play Project, while still increasing profits. And this is a key requirement 
for their project, profit. They are not an NGO, and as Mycoskie stated, Bain 
invested in TOMS to get returns, not just due to charitable giving, but because 
“they see our giving and our purpose as a competitive advantage”(Lebowitz, 
2016). The CEO knows only a profit-seeking firm will be able to sustainably 
develop prosocial programs based on long-term revenues, while NGOs are 
dependent on spontaneous private or public funding and support. 
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This is a very important dimension to nudging. Previous academia strongly 
focuses on non-profit organizations and policy makers. The objective of 
nudging has been one that creates prosocial outcome, by making decisions 
clearer and incentivizing them for individuals, while respecting their freedom 
of choice. By promoting their socially responsible program of donating a pair of 
shoes per pair sold at their stores, the alliance between solving inequality 
problems while increasing sales, is a success loop. The more the firm sells the 
more they can donate. The higher the quantity donated, the bigger the value 
that the firm has for the recipients of TOMS interventions, but the value is also 
felt by consumers that want firms to aid these communities (Edelman, 2016).  
To conclude, the reason why nudging shows potential for brands is due to 
the fit that it brings to current strategies, as there are many types of nudges that 
can be applied, as it is an adaptable tool. As a cost-effective and transparent 
tool, it has been proven to bring better fruition at lesser costs than traditional 
techniques, making it easier to analyze the data from experimentation 
(Sunstein, 2014a). Nudging may surge as a candidate to promote 
differentiation, as these propositions incorporate a “win-win” mentality for 
both the firm and consumers, creating further affinity with individuals. Policy 
makers will be kept out of the equation as these measures are intended for 
companies to employ, but their experiments will still be accounted for as they 
bring valuable information. In order to start the next chapter on prosocial 
behavior and the nudging examples that will follow, a nudge does not look to 
explore individual’s biases. Since the main concern over nudging is the threat 
that firms have over being able to subconsciously manipulate individuals, 
Sunstein reacts by referring nudging as a tool that neutralizes bias without the 
need to “explore” individual’s vulnerabilities (Sunstein, 2014b). 
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Chapter 3 
Prosocial behavior 
Prosocial consumer behavior involves self-sacrifice. Prosocial company 
behavior should, through analogy, follow the same course. Through forgoing 
resources such as time, money, or other forms of sacrifice, a prosocial endeavor 
leads to voluntarily improving an individual, a local community, or even a 
specific target of individuals – “intrinsically motivated voluntary behavior 
intended to benefit another” (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2007).  
While prosocial behavior requires self-sacrifice and positive impact for the 
community as a consequence of action, it can still be motivated by self-centered 
reasons such as hedonic pleasure, reputation concerns, empathy, among others 
(Eisenberg et al., 2007; Santrock, 2008; Small & Cryder, 2016). The difference 
between prosocial behavior and socially impactful behavior stems from the 
sacrifice the former requires that the latter does not. 
The analogy is possible since “as people make inferences about a person’s 
character based on their generous acts, consumers make similar inferences 
about corporations’ and brands’ character” (Small & Cryder, 2016). Firms can 
find selfish results while positively impacting their community, albeit 
“prosocial actors who benefit are perceived as less benevolent than those who 
do not” (Lin-Healy & Small, 2013) showcasing the drawback firms will endure 
due to consumer’s skeptical nature.  
While we talk about prosocial behavior and consumer inference with 
specificity to nudging, the basis of understanding how that inference occurs 
relies on consumer’s perspective of said behavior. The pillar of one’s 
perspective over prosocial firm behavior is the intrinsic concern consumers 
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have of for-profit firms. It is based on the possible ulterior motives behind 
firm’s self-entitled prosocial endeavors.  
In order for a behavior to be prosocial we know it requires some form of 
sacrifice from the agent. In order to recognize if firms are indeed incurring in 
sacrifice, their social projects are analyzed by consumers if whether or not any 
sacrifice is being made, as expectations towards firms are to increase profits by 
masquerading their intentions. In the case of a firm presenting a socially 
impactful program, consumers “avoid the correspondence bias” due to their 
skepticism of the real motivation behind said program, as it may not be a 
prosocial behavior but simply a for-profit socially impactful behavior. In the 
last chapter of the thesis we will look into the relationship between prosocial 
behavior and profit in order to understand what the inferences consumers 
generate of said relationship. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Corporation Nudging individuals – areas of 
Social Impact 
Throughout examples of nudging and prosocial behavior, majority of 
evidence regarding consumer inference will come from CSR programs. The 
nudges presented however, are not directly linked to CSR as these do not 
require large scale investments to be developed, they may or may not be 
inserted in CSR endeavors. Since consumers aren’t the only recipients of 
benefits, “both consumers and the social issues the initiatives represent benefit 
as well” (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004), nudging presents itself as a strategy that 
promotes positive change in communities, and may originate on firms’ 
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prosocial values. The need to help correct the decision-making flaws of 
individuals (Hausman & Welch, 2010), is the focal point of nudging. This 
orientation should be considered throughout the reading session of the 
following topics, and that is to correct hurtful behavior of individuals for their 
own wellbeing (R Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
A company may look to start producing in an environmental sustainable 
manner, to aid production areas with investments, or look to generate sustained 
yield based on those investments, so that besides prosocial outcomes of local 
development, it will also generate profit maximization (Goodland, 1995). 
Several studies indicate that the success nudging generates as a tool, 
outperforms historical techniques. Examples such as retirement savings 
“reminder nudges” saw an increase of yearly contributions per $1 spent, more 
than 80% on average to those of traditional incentives. On energy consumption 
savings, a social norm nudge lead to an increase to 27.3 kWh saved per $1 
spent, while the previous best alternative were traditional incentives and 
education with 14 kWh per dollar, almost doubling its effect. These examples 
show that without any pre-requirement from consumers, without any need to 
invest on educating them, and without any financial incentive added on top of 
the savings that the household can get, a nudge can reach greater results while 
being a simple, cost-effective technique (Benartzi et al., 2017). On the other 
hand, there are nudges that do impact education, or that impact consumers and 
firms through small financial incentives. The fact that a nudge can be executed 
differently based on different principles and expected outcomes, appears to be a 
potent tool to change behavior, that presents itself as a successful cost-effective 
measure (Wright, Garcia-Alexander, Weller, & Baicker, 2017). Only through 
experimentation one can understand the impact a nudge may have, as it is a 
practical instrument that requires field observation.  
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We will look to grasp, through presenting nudging cases, how they help 
change behavior with a prosocial goal, while collaterally looking understanding 
how it represents an interesting investment for firms. Our focus will be on 
consumer’s expectations, beliefs, and reactions to what firms do. Firstly, firm’s 
behavior affects consumers inferences. Consequentially, based on how 
consumers deduce and react, their actions will be influenced by the prosocial 
activities of firms, positively or negatively.  
In the upcoming chapter, we will analyze examples of nudges that firms 
utilize in order to reach a prosocial goal. In the second chapter, we will 
investigate with detail what makes consumers react in one way or the other, 
whether into approving or disproving a company, or if, and how, they are 
going to support or punish a firm. After these two chapters, the last one will 
look to bring light on how firms can act prosocially while also achieving profit, 
and if consumers believe that a firm can be both prosocial as well as profit-
seeking. 
1. Areas of Social Impact: Health 
a. Employer health plans have been requiring drug-buyers to change their 
buying habit by having them order medication over e-mail. Through this 
technique, pharmaceutic firms will reduce costs in points of sale. Home 
delivery also provides better convenience for both consumers and firms. For 
consumers, transportations costs and time spent traveling and ordering 
medication is almost eliminated, as orders can be done through any internet-
connected device. The attempt to increase medication treatment adherence 
increased, being the main prosocial outcome of the measure. Users who 
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switched to email order showed an increase of over 10% in program 
completion, going from 74.2% to 85% (Schmittdiel et al., 2011). 
The nudge in question facilitates and simplifies the steps required to acquire 
medicine, which enable consumers to continue their programs by reducing the 
number of barriers for its success. 
 
b. In 1965, Allen Parducci introduced a range-frequency model where 
companies would be compared and displayed in a rank based on the pricing. 
Variables taken into account by consumers suffer from this phenomenon, as 
slight absolute differences of products/services do not grant the same effect as 
relative differences (Parducci, 1965). By showing the product characteristics of a 
company in contrast to another company’s products under form of a ranking 
system, comparison is now made easier and possible. While analyzing several 
inputs of information for different products, not only do they amount in 
quantity, but also in complexity, which hinder decision-making. While there are 
heuristics that consumers use to help overcome this issue, examples such as 
presenting information in a leaner manner as these rankings do, will help 
articulate consumer’s decisions. 
In “Behavioral Economics 2014”, Henry Stott and peers lead a study 
comparing insurance quotes presenting several providers and ranking them 
through price. The first one would have the lowest price. Other information 
such as level of service quality reviewed was presented, but the rank was based 
on pricing. Other participants would see the same set of companies in different 
orders and with different values for price, excess, and reviews, leading to the 
above conclusion that the ranking system does generate a lot of decision 
making aid, as the market share of the firms in the test, were not the same in 
real markets. (Stott, 2014).  
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Information was set out in a more convenient manner that showcased how a 
change in filtered information, which then saw a simplified presentation, could 
change consumer’s decisions as these are overwhelmed by contractual 
conditions. Nudging based on graphic and simplified language did change 
consumer’s decisions with better preparation and relative comparison. 
 
c. In Jodi Begg’s chapter (2008) of the same book, issues such as drug 
compliance are brought into attention since they are issues affecting both 
pharmaceutic firms and consumers undergoing the drug program. Her 
suggestion to help increase the number of users who succeed their programs, 
relates to prospect theory. She describes the lack of aptitude of individuals to 
assess the weight of small percentages, and using it as means for motivation. 
Based on an experiment involving small probability financial incentives for 
drug treatment fulfilment, the results showcase prospect theory’s evidence. The 
study displays the potential with applying lottery-based financial incentives so 
to improve drug treatment adherence. With as low as a unique daily lottery per 
patient with an expected value of $3, incorrect dosage applied went from 22% 
down to 1,6% (Volpp et al., 2008).  
Through finding incentives that encourage users to correctly dosage 
themselves, the nudge showed great success. As health costs for treating those 
who dropout of their programs were higher than the expected value of the 
lotteries, the patients were able to reduce future possible costs by correctly 
maintaining the program’s correct drug administration.  
 
d. In a 2017 article of Health Affairs, a nudge was applied with great success 
to a specific income target, as “effects were more persistent in low-income 
populations” (Wright et al., 2017). With the goal of reducing “procrastination, 
complexity, and lack of salience of future benefits”, these researchers aided a 
 43 
group of people beyond the reach of traditional assistance. The nudges taken 
facilitated comprehension by simplifying the process of following treatment 
rules, offering friendly assistance through staff support, placing pictures with 
detailed information, and underlining the importance of completing deadlines. 
A combination of “behavioral informed design elements” was reinforced with 
outreach reminders as deadlines approached, through the contact points of e-
mail, phone, and mail. The difference between the control group and the 
intervention group, was that the control group was faced with traditional 
contact and support, while the intervention group had extended personalized 
outreach and adherence support. 
Overall, the nudge of enhanced communication strategy for those seeking 
insurance increased enrollment by 50% relative to the control group. The low-
cost intervention was as effective as the higher-cost intervention, meaning the 
most cost-effective nudge was the better result. For those who did not seek 
insurance, the low-cost plan was a 10% increase comparing to the control 
group. In the end, both insurance seeking and non-insurance seeking patients 
were positively affected by the nudge.  
 
e. In 2017’s “Nudging for Good Awards”, La Roche Posay presented the 
winner of the competition, a UV Patch that helps control time between 
sunscreen application for the user. By placing their tiny sticker on any part of 
the body where sunscreen is applied, the user can point the smartphone’s 
camera at the sticker like a QR code, and immediately know when the 
sunscreen needs to be reapplied. Their experiment lead to noticeable results as 
37% of users used more sunscreen as before, and 63% of the users experienced 
less sunburn. The patch was given for free and stays the same way in over 36 
countries and can even be delivered through online order (La Roche Posay, 
2017). 
 44 
Since people are aware of their incapability to correctly apply sunscreen and 
take the required steps to safeguard their skin, the sticker came in handy. A 
study by IPSOS and La Roche Posay indicated 88% of beach goers lack 
protection during sun exposure, while only 36% of people show high levels of 
knowledge of the risks involved. With this small patch, users are nudged to not 
only apply sunscreen more often and when required, but also to learn how long 
each application usually lasts, which eventually increases their education of the 
matter (IPSOS & La Roche Posay, 2016).  
 
f. In 2009, General Electric requested an experiment to help reduce the 
number of employees who smoked. To do so, they carried out an experiment 
with financial incentives for those who were included in the treatment group. 
The control group had no intervention, while the treatment group received two 
incentives: those who didn’t smoke for 6 months would be given $250, and 
those who extended this duration to 12 months would receive additional $400. 
Results showed how the treatment group, after 12 months, was almost 3 times 
more successful than the control group, which had no incentives. After the 
program ended at the 12-month mark, researchers noted that after 18months, 
the same ratio of 3 times more people had stop smoking comparing to the 
control group. 
The nudge in question not only reduced the number of smokers for the year-
long study, but also continued to bring fruition after the incentives period 
ended. Those who participated were willing to quit smoking, but while the 
control group showed small results at 5% on the 12-month mark, the nudge 
showed adherence of 14.7% (Volpp et al., 2009). 
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2. Areas of Social Impact: Environment 
a. EnergyStar’s “smart” power strips, an active daily-use instrument for 
power consumption, was introduced to aid individuals who are concerned 
about electricity waste. The concept of helping families save money and reduce 
electricity waste through combining power sockets and a smartphone app 
facilitates turning off all unneeded devices at home (Energy Star, 2018). The 
execution is done through the sale of customized power sockets, with extra 
color information on the sockets themselves, with different colors for each 
socket space. In the app, consumers are able to completely shut off electricity 
feed to the sockets they choose, as the app has the colors of the sockets with a 
description written by the consumer of what is connected to what color. In that 
way, one can turn off a lot of devices with ease, which helped achieve its goals: 
reduce electric waste, and reduce unnecessary electricity expenses. 
The firm even originated the Energy Star scheme that started in America in 
1992. This program is now international and is characterized by a logo that is 
granted to specially energy efficient tools. Just as the previous example, the core 
concerns are continuous use, and “standby” waste (The Economist, 2006).  
 
b. Another case, in 2008, was an experiment looking to find an optimal 
strategy with social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels, 
which reached surprising results as to what the traditional techniques had 
reached. The goal of the experiments was to find a way to increase towel reuse 
rate, so to reduce the amount of resources required to clean the towels. By 
displaying information tagged on towel racks in different manners and with 
different targets, the authors increased towel reuse rates from 38% (standard 
environmental message) up to 49% with descriptive norms.  
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The key to this change results from the fact that participants were more 
influenced by “descriptive norms when the setting in which those norms are 
formed is comparable to the setting those individuals are currently occupying” 
(N. J. Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). The social norm with most 
impact was one with “same room identity descriptive norm”. Their study 
showed how hotel guests are more influenced by descriptive norms of “group 
of individuals with whom they shared the same setting” than groups of people 
sharing the same social setting. Social identities of gender, and environmentally 
concerned people were the most pinpointed, by participants, as the suspects for 
most towel reuse. However, gender and citizen identity were the second and 
third-worst participating causes, respectively, right after the standard 
environmental message (N. J. Goldstein et al., 2008). 
The nudge in question is a result from a decision-making bias called social 
norms, which are “the behavioral expectations, or rules, within a society or 
group”, which can be explicit in information, or implicit in behavior (Vlaev, 
King, Halpern, Hallsworth, & Dolan, 2010). While not controlling participants, 
they were engaged by the message and motivated to be part of the solution to 
the problem of environmental waste. Those who participated in the program 
accepted the opportunity to actively help what they believe to be a worthy 
cause, and one that deserves their support. 
 
c. In 2011, two experiments were made at hotel restaurants where buffets 
were available. The objective of the two approaches was to reduce food waste. 
The first experiment was made using smaller plates for the buffet, in hopes to 
make food seem bigger by occupying more plate space. The second attempt 
was through sign salience with a text as follows, “Welcome back! Again! And 
again! Visit our buffet many times. That’s better than taking a lot once”. Both 
tests reached the same level of food waste reduction, and they only require one 
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to be existent. Researchers were able to “reduce the amount of food waste in 
hotel restaurants by around 20%”, and while restaurants already had smaller 
plates for their table’s presentation, costs were negative since no new plates 
were acquired and the outcome revealed to be a financial positive outcome to 
the restaurant with less food served (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2013). 
Through nudging a social cue through the sign’s message, or through 
changing the perception of how much percentage of plate the food took, in both 
situations the same result was achieved, food waste was reduced and less 
“lifecycle emissions of around 1.9 kg of CO2e” were reduced per 1kg of food. In 
the first scenario, with a smaller plate, not only do people serve and eat less 
food due to visual illusions that bias perception, but smaller plates themselves 
lead to underserving, making it a cumulative effect (Ittersum et al., 2011).  
 
d. Looking at a technique that seems more common to spot and one we can 
identify easier with, is the symbolic tax supermarkets have over using plastic 
bags. While a tax does naturally represent a policy-maker intervention, it could 
reveal itself as a cheap, easy to test tool to reduce plastic waste. While the 
measure looked to reduce usage of disposable bags, reusable bags were seen to 
increase as well, to compensate for the cost of disposable bags. The proportion 
of customers using a disposable bag was seen to result in half the usage of those 
bags, while also more than doubling usage of reusable bags. The authors also 
compared taxing with bonus of incentives at the same time, but results stayed 
nearly the same, not justifying the added bonuses. The tax applied was of 5 
cents, which gave an information cue that the cost was there to reduce the 
number of bags sold due to their impact on environment. The bonus was of 5 
cents as well, but it did not conclude any impact even when allied to the tax, 
negating the overall cost.  
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Resulting discussion revealed that individuals identify the impact those 
disposable bags have as they were sent to waste after usage. Not only do the 5-
cent cost reduce the purchase of these bags, but it also incentives the purchase 
of environmental-friendly reusable bags, as these had a steeper price and were 
sturdily made for reuse purpose. Since the 5 cent is a small, symbolic cost, this 
nudge does not reduce individual’s capability to shop with disposable bags, but 
also increases prosocial behavior by using reusable bags, which increased more 
than the amount that disposable bags declined (Homono, 2015).  
3. Areas of Social Impact: Financial 
a. Thaler and Benartzi developed a SMarT (Save More Tomorrow) plan 
where participants were faced with an option to allocate future portions of their 
salary for savings, instead of doing it right now. Evidence showed how 
“behavioral explanations for this behavior stress bounded rationality and self-
control and suggest that at least some of the low-saving households are making 
a mistake and would welcome aid in making decisions about their saving” 
(Richard H Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  
Results were of 78% entering the plan, and 80% of those “remained in it 
through the fourth pay raise”. Those participants saw an increase in savings 
from 3.5% to 13.6% over the duration of 40 months.  
This endeavor was tested in a corporate setting, as Phillips Electronics 
employees were given financial advice and participated in information 
seminars, to which saw their participation increase between experimental 
group and control group. Due to the overweight that is given to short-term time 
windows compared to long-term periods, as money seems more valuable now 
than in a year time, participants show higher inclination toward putting money 
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aside in the future, than in the moment. Present bias does make individuals feel 
short-term payoffs to be of higher value than a long-term payoff, even if the 
second is of higher financial worth (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). Researchers 
have concluded when rewards are very distant in time, they cease to be wanted, 
due to time discounting (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). 
In this case, the deficient behavior of not saving enough for the future was 
acknowledged by the participants. The SMarT program helped nudge 
individuals toward the desired increase in future financial stability, which they 
had trouble doing by themselves. Automating this service would also reduce 
preoccupation on the side of the bank account holders, while assuring them 
proper savings plan was in course with increased savings rate per year. In the 
end, employee participation in pension funds increased mostly based on auto-
enrollment (McElvoy & Coggan, 2016) 
 
b. Utilizing a previous example, this one for active every-day use, are Energy 
Star’s “smart” power strips. The concept of helping families save and reducing 
electricity waste through combining power sockets and a smartphone app 
facilitates turning off all unneeded devices at home (Energy Star, 2018). The 
execution is done through the sale of customized power sockets, with extra 
color information on the sockets themselves, with different colors for each 
socket space. In the app, consumers are able to completely shut off electricity 
feed to the sockets they choose, as the app has the colors of the sockets with a 
description written by the consumer of what is connected to what color. 
In the example of Energy Star’s “smart” power strips, besides having the 
capability to shut down every linked power socket, it also is timer-equipped, 
occupancy sensitive with motion detection, and current sensing which turns off 
when a device in the master socket has been set to standby (Energy Star, 2018). 
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Even the U.S. Department of Energy official website shows an article on these 
gadgets (NREL, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). 
The nudge in question reduces electricity waste through disabling 
unnecessary gadgets automatically and also through effortless manual disable. 
By doing so, financial cost is minimized by aiding consumers to reach what 
they want, and that is to reduce financial and environmental waste. 
 
c. “Keep the change” is an example of a financial experiment that both aids 
firms and consumers, and in this case, banks and bank account holders. Bank of 
America’s program would round their consumer’s debit card transactions to the 
next dollar and would place that amount in their corresponding savings 
account. So, if the account holder were to spend $2,75 on a tea, the bank would 
transfer $0,25 from the debit account to the savings account. The money is 
always in the consumer’s accounts, but it is transferred to an account that 
discourages its usage on the risk of losing the contractual interest rate. The 
consumer needs three connections with the same bank: a debit card, a checking 
account, and a savings account. While transferring from the debit account 
transactions, in case the available money is lower than the next transaction, it 
will not go through as a credit card would. After one is locked in with these 
contracts, automatic savings does relief consumers. The result was an increase 
in $1.8 million new savings accounts, and 1.3 million new checking accounts, all 
this for the first 19 months. The potential of the program is to “increase debit 
card use, reduce bank costs associated with processing paper checks, and 
generate incremental interchange revenues from each debit card transaction” 
(Tufano & Schneider, 2009). 
In the same way SMarT facilitated consumer’s savings option through 
automatic programs, while not through progressive increase of the savings 
amount, with “Keep the change”, bank account holders will be able to save 
 51 
every time they use their money, which also makes for an easy way to control 
how much they save during the day, making it a nudge for good. A savings-
related nudge also presented by the same author was the following option. 
 
d. Tufano presented a “Save to Win” program where those who would put at 
least $25 in a “Save to Win” certificate of deposit would be entered in a $400 
monthly “saving raffle” and the yearly $100,000 jackpot. It was tested out in 
Michigan credit unions which attracted “$3.1 million in new deposits” (Utah’s 
Credit Unions, 2009). 
 
e. In order to increase employee participation in a 401(k) plan in a U.S. 
corporation, researchers investigated ways to put in practice an automatic 
policy. They opted into a default automatic enrollment for a determined 
savings rate. Those who were employed before/after the enrollment program, 
were, after 6 months, showing a participation of around 20%. For those 
employees hired during the default “opt-out” 401(k) automatic enrollments, 
participation was, after 6 months, at 80%.  
With similar goals such as the “Save More Tomorrow” and “Save to Win” 
programs, this nudge applied the default bias where people tend to not “opt-
out” of the standard option to save. Being inserted in the contract as a standard 
technique, new employees were keen to stay in the savings plan as the bias 
promoted that behavior (Madrian & Shea, 2000). 
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Chapter 5 
Consumer perception of socially impactful 
companies 
After realizing how firms can utilize nudges to improve consumer behavior, 
we will now understand how consumers react to firm’s attempt to change their 
behavior. While the nudging brings only positive outcomes for individuals, if 
the reputation that the firm has in a community is low, expectations of 
consumers will be high, and reactions to hypocrite investments will suffer 
severe backlash.  
As firms show positive social impact, consumers will react accordingly to 
what firms do, but also differently from other consumers, as each of them may 
have different beliefs. First, we will understand how consumers react to firms 
that act prosocially. It is important to understand what are the expectations that 
a market has for a specific firm. In case it has a great reputation for continuous 
supportive behavior, consumers will reward that firm, and will be less 
punishing in case a crisis happens. On the other hand, if a firm is known to not 
care, or to not have values oriented to help society, consumers may react 
negatively if their prosocial actions seem hypocritical.  
While beliefs toward that firm may be hard to overcome as consumers have a 
level of expectations towards a firm that behaves purely selfishly, there is 
always room to start. Although consumers will be skeptical of all prosocial 
behavior from for-profit firms, they infer carefully about those that do not share 
awareness values and show higher levels of connection to historically ethical 
firms.  
Consumer’s judge one another’s apparent prosocial behavior by looking to 
identify their motivation. Through analogy it follows that individuals depict 
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firms based on the same motives, such as self-interested motives or self-
perception. Hedonic benefits, empathy, and sympathy are attributes given to 
single agents such as individuals, while the collection of individuals that 
constitute a firm and act to represent the brand which does not receive hedonic 
benefits or feel empathy/sympathy per se. 
As such, consumers are skeptical of private firm’s possible intentions, such as 
attention-seeking, status, the need to be perceived as a generous firm, or even 
the need the firm has to prove to itself that their values respect society’s needs. 
Actions that are based on self-perception issues help prove to stakeholders the 
positive impact of the firm, and that they can be part of that help if they keep 
supporting the firm. Since consumers that practice this dimension believe in the 
social norm that “altruistic acts should be purely motivated”, the case is more 
difficult for firms since their goals to concentrate capital and reach positive 
financial results is clear knowledge for their consumers, which may be “leading 
to counterintuitive effects” (Small & Cryder, 2016). 
This said, we will consider ethical behavior from firms as their capability to 
respect communities’ ethos, and how they manage to be socially impactful while 
doing so. In order to understand consumer’s perspective over the subjects, we 
will start off with their inferences over a company’s un/ethical behavior. 
Afterwards we will move to how consumers reward firms that align with their 
expectations, and then realize how this translates in terms of purchasing 
behavior. 
1. Consumer perspective of ethical behavior 
When consumers and managers speak of ethics, they “mean a set of moral 
principles or values to guide behavior” (Sherwin, 1983). The basis of ethical or 
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unethical behavior lies in the morals. While ethics constitutes an exterior group 
of values and thus the values of a community, it origins from the internal right 
or wrong conduct of individuals, the morals. The author states how ethics 
“considers the justifications people offer for the principles and values they 
hold”.  
The moral approach we utilize here will dictate how individuals evaluate 
company behavior and will be used to analyze the reaction consumers make. 
While looking to check if a company’s behavior fits a moral code, we must 
understand whichever theory consumers adopt, will differ its reaction towards 
firms. In this sense, we will point out academician’s literature on morals, and 
not specify a single theory to analyze.  
Several authors have studied new approaches to morals, but they evolve 
from three main theories: utilitarian theory which focuses on the overall welfare 
of individuals, rights-based theory that concerns itself to “emphasize the 
entitlements of individuals”, and justice theory which relates to an unbiased 
distribution effect (Cavanagh, Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981). Depending on 
which theory consumers ground their morals, perspective will change 
accordingly.  
While all these topics are somewhat connected, consumer’s expectations 
regarding any aspect of firms are based on their personal beliefs. When a 
community, or individual, is faced with a firm’s behavior that violates their 
ethic beliefs, then reaction will negatively impact the firm. In this case, 
expectations were not met, and as such satisfaction was not reached (Creyer, 
1997). This dimension relates to prospect theory as our beliefs are the reference 
point when evaluating a firm. If ethical behavior surpasses that reference point, 
consumers will see it as a gain. If an unethical behavior occurs, then is will be 
seen as a loss. 
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In terms of consumer decision-making, three types of reference points have 
been studied: aspiration-based which relate to what the consumer wishes to 
happen, market-based reference composed of what is currently active, and 
history-based that relates to what the consumer has seen and dealt with 
previously (Klein & Oglethorpe, 1987).  
This said, consumers who wish to positively impact their community 
through their consumption plan their decision-making under aspiration-based 
expectation. They seek out from firms to match their desired behavior and 
expectations, while also generating social impact. Since they expect a level of 
ethical behavior that positively impacts communities, firms need to invest in 
non-sporadic endeavors in order to gain consumer’s preference. Creyer states 
that firms are under several pressure points, one of those being that a company 
which continuously develops an ethical conduct will be reacted upon neutrally, 
and not positively. Consumers do not quickly identify a positive behavior as a 
gain, but as a neutral reality that compensates for their negative impact, a form 
of compensation. However, not all is bad for firms, as they are capable of 
understanding if their behavior has satisfied consumers through the price these 
individuals pay for their products (Creyer, 1997).  
There are documented consumer reactions when faced with un/ethical firms. 
While in the next chapter we will talk about the relationship between consumer 
and firms, and how they reward or punish companies, we must discuss how 
consumers will process two types of behaviors from firms. These will be ethical 
and unethical behaviors. According to each one’s expectation, we must 
approach how these reactions can vary highly.  
In Creyer’s experiment, four measures were taken regarding ethicality of 
firms, such as: willingness to reward firms, willingness to punish firms, 
importance of ethical behavior for consumption, expectations about ethical 
behavior of firms. Through questions with rating scales from 1 to 7, the most 
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supported measure was the importance consumers have whether firms behave 
ethically, with an average of 5.26 points. The next important behaviors were 
willingness to reward, and willingness to punish, being the first one slightly 
higher, with 5.04 against 5.03 points, respectively. The least important measure 
but still over the median, was expecting firms to behave ethically, which had 
4.97 points. All the measures indicate importance to consumers that companies 
share their ethical views, and that they are willing to react according to whether 
they are satisfied or not with companies’ ethical conduct. Concluding the study, 
the level of importance consumers give to ethical behavior is the best indicator 
to predict their reaction, while expectations still do matter but to a less extent 
(Creyer, 1997). 
Regarding consumer’s attitude toward information about firm’s ethical and 
unethical behavior, reactance is asymmetrical. This is due to a negative bias 
similar to what we have seen in prospect theory, in the sense that “vices detract 
from attitudes more than virtues enhance them” (Folkes & Kamins, 1999). The 
authors reveal that when firms behave morally, consumer inference is more 
unambiguous about the nature of the firm, while moral behavior does not 
reveal an explicit positive character (Krakowiak, 2015). The example Folkes and 
Kamins give about an individual that steals and another person that returns 
money when the cashier gives too much back, even if the amount is equal, 
showcases how consumers react strongly to the thief for the immoral behavior, 
but only slightly positive for the one who returns the money. Explanation 
comes from informational cues people have of behavior such that immoral 
characters are more inconsistent. On the other hand, moral individuals are 
more consistent, or regular morally respectful people, which shows difference 
based on spectator’s beliefs (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  
“Generally, corporate associations fall into two categories: corporate ability 
and corporate social responsibility “ (Zasuwa, 2011). These are the two main 
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positioning strategies to what concerns corporate image. Corporate image is a 
concept that is composed of other concepts that relates to corporate reputation 
and corporate identity. It is the cognitive image consumers create of the firm, as 
it has an external dimension, but also an internal one, and it includes internal 
stakeholders. It represents the capacity a firm has of producing and delivering 
goods/services. These may originate from associations with efficiency or even 
consumer’s preference. While it represents a broad part of firms, it is one that 
belongs in individual’s cognition. The term corporate social responsibility is one 
that relates to the status and activities a firm preforms in connection to “societal 
obligations” (Zasuwa, 2011). Both terms are important for the development of 
this chapter, as corporate ability is influenced by consumers perception of the 
product side of the firm, while consumer’s expectations and beliefs will affect 
their opinions about CSR. Product attributes are one part of corporate ability, as 
they not only influence CA, but also create opinions for consumers, which 
eventually lead to changing their opinion toward CSR based on that firm’s 
products/services.  
To understand how consumers react to different types of ethical actions, we 
must move on to product attributes. Since assessing firm’s ethical actions 
depends on a multivariable thought process, besides the behavior of a firm, its 
products must also be analyzed. The same asymmetric conditions apply to 
products the same way it did to behavior. While negative product attributes are 
linked to lower-quality products only, positive attributes are linked to all levels 
of product quality (Folkes & Kamins, 1999).  
Through experimentation, the authors concluded that consumers were 
heavily critical of unethical firms regardless of product attribute. Even ethical 
firms that simply refrain from unethical behavior but also do not care to resolve 
it, were almost equally critiqued by consumers as unethical firms were. Product 
performance was only regarded when ethical firms helped find a solution for 
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the problem at hand. This information cue comes from the conclusion that 
“helping provides the consumer with less ambiguous information about the 
nature of the firm” (Folkes & Kamins, 1999). Overall, refraining from vice did 
not seem to elicit better reactions for consumers, as these only identify positive 
behavior when firms actively look to help communities. When faced with 
similar amounts of information regarding an unethical firm or an active ethical 
firm, consumers were able to give longer and better reasons regarding why 
ethical firms behave the way they do, showing how concerned people are to 
support the right firms.  
In terms of purchase decisions, studies indicate three levels of ethicality for 
firms: unethical firms, ethical firms who refrain from any negative or positive 
action, and ethical firms who actively engage in prosocial tasks. As we have 
seen before, unethical and passive ethical firms are seen as similar. However, 
actively ethical firms are highly preferred and wanted by consumers. In a 
survey with questions ranging from -3 to 3 points regarding preference, 
consumer average indicating preference for the actively passive firm was 1.5 
points when purchases were in question (Carl & Trudel, 2004). In the same 
study, 48% of participants felt prosocial endeavors should receive the same 
attention as financial performance, while 33.7% feel performance should be 
priority, but society and environmental questions should be second most 
important concern.  
Across all studies, a few topics repeatedly emerge. The expectations of 
ethical behavior and product sold, the high levels of responsibility towards 
correcting society’s problems, and also that majority of consumers find normal 
if sometimes firms act unethically, are the common conclusions (Carl & Trudel, 
2004).  
We have been talking about two situations of what consumers expect from 
firms, and when they react to firms. Both are important for ethical concerns, but 
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ethics is not just a means to evaluate firms, but also an instrument for firms to 
utilize. While superficially, let’s understand how ethics can aid firms, with an 
example of service recovery. Service recovery “refers to the actions a service 
provider takes in response to service failure” (Gronroos, 1988). Looking to win 
the consumer back, firms engage in service recovery mechanisms to better their 
image. Comparing ethical approaches to unethical approaches on satisfaction, 
quality, switching, complaint, voice contact, private contact, and third-party 
complaints, ethical recovery showed better results in all of these aspect by up to 
40%. Ethical recovery indicated higher satisfaction levels, higher quality levels, 
lower intention to switch, and lower intention to complain across all variables 
for unhappy consumers (Alexander, 2002).  
Since we are able to acknowledge morality as a variable in the decision-
making of individuals, and after the evidence supplied that it is a major 
contributor for consumer satisfaction and purchase intention, we will approach 
now what are consequences of prosocial and CSR programs on several aspect of 
individuals preference, such as loyalty. 
2. Loyalty, Consumer-Company identification, 
outcomes of CSR on Consumer-Company relationship 
The effects of CSR influence loyalty variables such as company evaluation, 
identity attractiveness, and consumer-company identification. Researchers 
conclude that these three mediate the positive impact that CSR has on loyalty. 
While they have different relationships with one another, “company evaluation 
mediates the relationship between CSR and identity attractiveness” (Marin, 
Ruiz, & Rubio, 2009). Company evaluation showed the strongest impact, 
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followed by identity attractiveness, and in third consumer-company 
identification.  
In more literature, consumer-company identification, while positively related 
to identity attractiveness, serves a part in influencing in-role behavior, and 
extra-role behavior. The in-role behavior, or core-task behavior, relates to 
employee’s official work that translates to their salary system. Extra-role 
behavior relates to the level of “citizenship” an employee might spontaneously 
generate besides its core-tasks (Zhu, 2013). Consumers’ level of consumer-
company relationship did positively affect the roles of workers, which lead to 
increased working conditions. These characteristics of firms would later on 
impact communities since “organization’s characteristics contributed to the 
development of C-C identification” (Ahearne, Bhattacharya, & Gruen, 2005). 
To broaden the scope of consumer perception over socially impactful firms, 
internal company outcomes such as awareness, attributions, attitude, and 
attachment need our attention. These internal outcomes require adaptation as 
there is “heterogeneity across consumers in their reactions to CSR initiatives” 
(Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). Awareness is a pre-requisite attribute of whether 
consumers are aware, or not, that a firm engages in positive social behavior – 
“awareness is a necessary condition for any favorable attitudinal and/or 
behavioral response to be evoked” (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). Attributions 
relate to the worrisome idea that CSR projects might not be sincere, and as such 
just a means to achieve profit. The two key factors in Attributions pinpointed 
by the authors are company’s reputation, and its fit with the social endeavor. 
Consumer attitude is another inference that changes if they are aware of a 
socially impactful program run by that firm. This attitude shows a positive 
relationship with the other factors since the better overall picture consumers 
have of a firm, the stronger the attitude and affinity toward it. The last variable 
is that affinity. Attachment, as it is called, is a reoccurring phenomenon we have 
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talked about earlier, called the consumer-company identification, a product of 
past experiences. 
On another sphere of internal outcomes, there is also the consumer’s well-
being. Through focus groups, the authors found that a company’s prosocial 
behavior may impact the overall sense of well-being of the community. 
“Without (…) necessarily translating to company-specific benefits”, consumers 
aware of a social activity lead by a firm will be granted more pleasure. Some 
participants noted how their consumption feels more impactful knowing that 
firms enable that prosocial behavior. 
As we are able to understand, literature may dwell deeper on levels of 
impact for consumers or what variables are considered for inferences, but the 
majority of authors agree that existing variables for consumer perspective are 
all connected and need careful integration. 
Loyalty is one type of external outcome from companies, but there are more. 
Purchase intention, and word-of-mouth are other aspects to consider.  
Willingness to purchase is linked with prosocial behavior when four criteria 
are met: when the consumer supports the problem pertaining to the CSR 
program; when there is a tight fit between firm and the cause supported; when 
the product’s quality matches a high level identified by consumers; and when 
there isn’t a premium price required for consumers to be able to help. 
Participants in the focus groups admitted to recommending peers to 
companies that promote social developments, even if they weren’t basing their 
own purchase decisions on that topic. This disposition to promote a company is 
partially explained by the level of identification with the company 
(Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). 
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3. Impact on purchase behavior 
Product evaluation is linked with product sophistication, the evaluation 
consumers make of firms, and even the level of social responsibility that 
products have (T. J. Brown & Dacin, 1997). Corporate association is a 
multivariable reality where product evaluation and other aspects such as price 
weight in on the consumer response. We focus on socially impactful firms and 
how endeavors such as CSR influence purchase behavior. A study focusing on 
environmental and philanthropic investments made by firms, concluded that 
CSR “affected purchase intent more strongly than price did”. Consumer’s 
acknowledgement of a company’s efforts to positively impact each of these 
cases, showcased an almost doubling purchase intent when the level of CSR 
was high, and it happened to both philanthropic endeavors and environmental 
ones. Results describe that low levels of information over CSR programs bring 
worse levels of purchase intent than no amount of information. Respondents 
that had low amounts of information identified firms as not doing enough, and 
their purchase intent punished those firms. The second-best possibility after 
having a high amount of information about what firms do to help communities, 
is to not know anything at all. Having slight information about their social 
activities brings the worst possible results. On the dimension of pricing, overall, 
when price was high or low, CSR showed the same levels of impact, and price 
was a less impactful variable than the level of CSR (Mohr & Webb, 2005). 
Consumers have admitted to continuously buying from unethical brands, 
but that they do so only if prices are kept low, which eventually hurts those 
firms. Businesses that do not show social concern are at a loss since markets 
already have a set of expectations which work as reference points for their 
decisions, and levels of social impact are one of those expectations. Consumers 
reward firms that look to resolve social issues and that tackle product-resultant 
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problems. They showcase that by affirming to have higher consideration for 
firms that do so, and by showing higher willingness of preference and 
willingness to pay higher prices (Creyer, 1997).  
If firms have built-in values that align with the cause they invest resources 
on, even if performance-related motives are mixed with the prosocial endeavor, 
consumers see them as “typical strategic goals”, such as number of fans 
acquired or increase in sales achieved. Reactance to these changes is still 
positive as “typical strategic goals of getting and keeping customers are 
inherent in the existence of a firm as a social actor and are widely accepted” 
(Ellen, 2006). On the other hand, if CSR efforts are related to requirements from 
stakeholders, consumers react negatively, as the origin of those efforts is not 
natural to the firm, but rather an obligation, which backfires by lowering 
consumer’s purchase intent. 
Extensive research has been done linking consumer’s response and firm’s 
positive social approach. A higher level of fit between the firm and the cause 
would translate on an expert transfer of resources (Hoeffler & Keller, 2002), an 
action based on the character of the firm aligning with the social investment 
(Fein, 1996), and a positive influence “in consumer beliefs, attitudes, and 
[purchase] intentions” (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, & Hill, 2006). In this last study, 
52% percent of consumers admitted to boycotting their consumption on firms 
with poor records of CSR. Besides level of fit, the commitment to a cause is an 
important dimension that determines whether or not a firm is exploiting the 
cause since it is about “what the recipient can do for the corporation”, and not 
how the corporation can bring value to the cause (L’Etang, 1994). Researchers 
describe three levels to commitment with social causes, being “the amount of 
input, the durability of the association, and the consistency (stability) of 
input”(Ellen, 2006). From these, the duration of the association was the most 
important cue for consumers to assert the company intentions, commitment to 
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success, and more time for consumers to learn about the relationship between 
the firm and the cause (Webb & Mohr, 1998) (Hoeffler & Keller, 2002) 
(Varadarajan & Menon, 1988).  
Since we are approaching purchase intention which is an external outcome of 
the relationship, there are also internal outcomes such as trust and affective 
identification, which are also means to increasing purchase intention. While 
willingness to buy has a positive relationship with trust, affective identification 
is linked with one’s membership, pride, and affiliation (Whetten & Godfrey, 
1998), which showed almost five times the sensitivity toward purchase 
intention (Lin, Chen, Chiu, & Lee, 2011). The same authors identify CA as being 
more influential than CSR as it is a means for CSR to be well executed, and 
somewhat translates the potential for CSR programs. 
In more recent surveys, The Harris Poll in 2014 found that 17% of Americans 
stated CSR having strong effect on their decisions, while 59% others admitted to 
being occasionally affected (The Harris Poll, 2014). 
Aflac surveyed Americans and found several important insights regarding 
purchase behavior over CSR firms. The leading reaction from consumers that 
are faced with responsible firms, is to prefer and buy their products (49%), and 
78% prefer firms that do it regularly than those who do it spontaneously 
(AFLAC & Fleishmanhiller, 2016).  
Regarding a worldwide perspective, 55% of consumers are willing to pay 
extra if their products are linked to social and environmental responsible firms, 
and 52% check if products have sustainable impact (Nielsen, 2014).   
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Chapter 6 
Profit-seeking and social impact supported by 
consumers 
The perfect reality for a firm would be to define a prosocial program that 
ultimately increases profit, while also minimizing costs. Even though profit-
seeking goals and prosocial endeavors might look opposite terms, they can 
cooperate. Studies by Edelman point out that 80% of consumers believe a firm 
can act to reach profit while also improving socio-economic conditions for the 
community.  
By investing in for-profit prosocial campaigns, firms may earn consumer’s 
trust. Consequentially, from those who do trust the firm, 59% spread positive 
word-of-mouth through recommendations to peers. Those peers who received 
recommendation, will act upon it, as 68% make purchases from brands they 
trust over others. In order to increase the level of trust, contributing to “the 
greater good” is a must for 45% of consumers (Edelman, 2016).  
This is an additional evidence for the need that firms have towards helping 
individuals. This necessity surfaces from societal expectations, and since 
consumers knowingly support firms that generate positive social impact above 
other firms, nudging may appear to be a tool that reaches profit beyond 
prosocial outcomes. Through Edelman’s study, 8 out of 10 consumers support 
firms that behave prosocially, even in the cases where the endeavor brings 
profit. 
In the perspective of firms, nudging is a seamless cost-effective tool that has 
been proven to beat traditional implemented tools (Wright et al., 2017). The 
main problem on the entrepreneurial side of nudging, is that a nudge seeks to 
correct problems in the decision-making of individuals, and as such, it cannot 
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be delineated and programed to purely seek financial result, and only as a 
consequence of helping consumers (R Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). If a firm looks 
to simply change behavior to what they believe is the correct behavior for 
individuals, that would be a marketing campaign, and not a nudging 
campaign.  
While we have already discussed that firms may reach financial results based 
on their socially impactful investments, we also know how skeptical consumers 
are of firms that may be behaving hypocritically. In fact, individuals who might 
behave in a selfless manner are observed with higher criticism regarding to 
possible selfish motivations than actual obvious selfish behavior. This happens 
since “people see «too much» self-interest in seemingly selfless actions, given 
their prior beliefs, but see the predicted amount of self-interest in seemingly 
selfish actions” (Critcher & Dunning, 2011). 
Taking this into account, and in order to respect the foundations of what 
composes a nudge, and to help consumers as well as the firm, a nudge must 
always be planned to correct individual’s behavior for their own welfare. In the 
process, if these individuals have been lacking on their drug adherence 
programs, if they have been eating unhealthily at canteens, or if any other 
negative behavior is observed, firms that look to correct these behaviors are also 
supported by consumers to gain profit, as they might be the ones selling the 
drug used for the program, or the healthy food to implement in consumer’s 
diets.  
Firms that engage in prosocial acts while focused on receiving benefits are 
seen as being less benevolent as those who do not receive compensation. Firms 
can receive benefits with their programs, but “selflessly motivated prosocial 
actors are perceived as less likely to benefit from their acts” (Lin-Healy & Small, 
2013). Literature shows how contradictory profit and prosocial behavior can be, 
as benefits for firms should not be the focus of socially impactful behavior. 
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While prosocial behavior is rarely seen as purely selfless, individuals still 
connect altruism with some form of self-sacrifice, as behaving without focus on 
benefits. The dichotomy has been studied and made clear how prosocial 
behavior can only be selfless if no benefits are received, and in case there are 
indeed benefits for the agent, then it is a selfish motivation (Lin-Healy & Small, 
2013).  
In this sense, if firms do engage in prosocial behavior to achieve profit, they 
will be interpreted as acting through selfishness. As socially impactful as an 
investment can be, if motivation is critiqued by consumers as it is based on self-
interest, the prosocial impact perceived by communities will be overlooked by 
the extrinsic motivation relating to the “tendency to be motivated partly by 
others’ perceptions”(D Ariely, Bracha, & Meie, 2009).  
Getting back to track, for a socially impactful behavior to achieve positive 
results for firms, whether directly or indirectly, it must be based on the need to 
help communities. CSR investments are planned toward increasing 
sustainability in procurement and distribution, while positively affecting local 
communities that are impacted by the firm’s activity (Investopedia, 2018). 
However, as the chapter is named after this issue, can CSR programs, a form of 
socially impactful attempt, be selfless and engage for profit?  
As we have seen before with Edelman’s survey, consumers respect 
companies that are socially impactful and that may get profit from that 
behavior, as societies required firms to help correct existing imbalances. The 
first point of this chapter is to understand that a prosocial endeavor, be it a 
nudge or a CSR program, can only be faced with support by individuals if it 
indeed helps them. The difference between nudging and socially impactful 
behavior relies on the motivation. While CSR programs may bring sustainable 
solutions, it is with the motivation to gain benefits either financially or imagery-
related, that firms engage on such practices (Asemah & Edegoh, 2013; Mandina, 
 68 
Maravire, & Masere, 2014). Pepsi’s Refresh Project is an example of this 
scenario. It helps link socially worried consumers with private investment. 
Consumers that have their opinions shared on their website, and that reach the 
highest level of support from peers, the one that is “liked” the most, will be 
integrated in the project and financed by PepsiCo (Tran Advisor & Krasner, 
2015). The project was later canceled as it did not bring enough financial results 
to the firm, bringing light to why individuals assess prosocial actions with 
skepticism, as motivation from PepsiCo was that “doing good would 
necessarily lead to good things for the firm as well”. 
Another example is the English gravy brand Bisto, that launched a campaign 
in 2014 called Spare Chair Sunday. It lasted three months, starting in December. 
The idea was a link between Spare Chair Sunday and another organization 
called Contact the Elderly, where families would cook a Sunday meal and 
invite an elder to dine with them, to combat loneliness. For those three months, 
volunteers for the Bisto CSR program reached 5,500 elders by the end of the 
campaign. Even while the prosocial goal was met, in the profit side of the firm, 
market share had been increasing over 4% over each year, tightly linked with 
their prosocial operations. Over that 3-month period, sales grew 20%, and by 
the end of the endeavor, the market share was of 80.3%, the highest it reached 
in the previous 5 years. Browne, former CEO of BP, stated that “the most 
inclusive companies achieve abnormal returns of more than 20% over a 10-year 
period compared to competitors” while underlining the long-term success of 
including all stakeholders in the company’s social behavior (Rogers, 2016). 
While based on the orientation of the project to reduce levels of elderly 
isolation, this campaign was not continued after its duration, and it was an 
isolated case which looked to be a mere marketing campaign that brought clear 
benefits for the firm, so literature and examples in real-world environments 
have shown how hit or miss these strategies can be. But agreement exists in the 
 69 
impossibility to fully fit prosocial impact and for-profit behavior, but it can 
partially occur. 
On the other hand, a nudge must be motivated through the identification of 
a mistake in the decision-making of individuals that can be corrected with 
proper research (Hausman & Welch, 2010). It must respect individual freedom, 
as its obligation is to not restrict choice, while changing behavior in a prosocial 
manner for the individuals at stake (R Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). It differentiates 
from a marketing tactic as the core existence of a nudge is to correct behavior, 
and not to sell a product. What past examples we have given and more that will 
be given below, cases where nudging brought benefits due to correcting 
consumers behavior, are good incentives for firms to aid societal needs. 
Nudging appears as that partial manner in which prosocial impact and for-
profit firms can interact. 
“Keep the change” savings program is one we have approached before. But 
besides increasing the amount of savings accounts in $1.8 million, it also had its 
positive outcomes for the Bank of America. Some of these were customer retain 
levels with a long-term interest rate for the savings account. If money is moved, 
then the rate will be affected. Consumers needed three connections with the 
same bank: a debit card, a checking account, and a savings account. To quit the 
program, consumers need to visit a bank branch or make a phone call, while its 
enrollment is easier and can be done online. This creates friction to exit out of 
the program, but the options are still there. For the bank, not only do they 
secure money since it was taken from checking accounts to the respective 
savings accounts, but also opening the savings account has a minimum of $25 
dollars for a child account, and $100 for a regular one, with monthly fees 
reaching $12 (Bank of America, 2018). After one is locked in with these 
contracts, automatic savings does relief consumers. The result, besides savings 
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accounts, was an increase in 1.3 million new checking accounts, all this for the 
first 19 months.  
The potential of the program for the bank is to “increase debit card use, 
reduce bank costs associated with processing paper checks, and generate 
incremental interchange revenues from each debit card transaction”. These new 
savings accounts earn an interest of “0.20 percent in the bank’s regular savings 
account permitting the bank to profit from the net interest margin” (Tufano & 
Schneider, 2009). 
Another example we have seen before as well, this time regarding health, is a 
lack of drug program completion. The 2017 article of Health Affairs, regarding a 
nudge that was applied with great success, proved how increased volume and 
number of contact points with clients lead to better regulation and program 
completion.  
Before treatment began, patients who were to be selected for treatment 
would undergo a patient list lottery, and in case they were accepted, they 
would be contacted. The pre-treatment stage was also under research. The 
study analyzed three cases where one would be contacted in the traditional 
sense, through basic mail acceptance note and e-mail application packet. 
Another group received low-intensity intervention, where besides the basic 
contact detailed above, they received more contacts ranging from postcards, to 
automated telephone messages, making these contacts cost $1.75 per person. 
The third group had high intensity, with added personalized phone contact and 
in-person outreach, having an individual cost of $28. The higher-intensity of 
contact lead to the highest enrollment, but not so far from the other two, less 
than five percental points from the others, which may not justify the difference 
in cost per person, since the cost increased by 1600% for a lower than 5% 
increase in enrollment. However, the low-intensity nudge showed a substantial 
increase of enrollment to justify its $1.75 cost, which resulted in lower income 
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families being able to increase their enrollment. This increased contact reach 
represented a level of support which meant for these families an increase in 
treatment success. 
As we saw before, enrollment increased by 50%, since patients were more 
self-aware and motivated to pursue the program. The low-cost intervention was 
as effective as the higher-cost intervention, meaning the most cost-effective 
nudge was the better result. In the end, both insurance seeking and non-
insurance seeking were positively affected by the nudge. Besides reaching its 
prosocial impact of increasing treatment completion, the firms selling that 
medicine also increased sales as treatment completion improved. 
To conclude this chapter, we have been following the potential nudging has 
with regards to its social impact while also being a profitable tool for 
companies. While consumers react differently to firms that positive impact 
communities while taking something out of it without a proper sacrifice, 
consumer inference is not as good as companies would like. Since prosocial 
behavior requires sacrifice which may lead to some form of benefit for firms, 
the “norm of self-interest” (Ratner & Miller, 2001) does not give companies 
much space to show their level of sacrifice, as consumers focus on the benefit 
the company gets and its selfish standard. Consumers are cynical of brand’s 
prosocial behavior as “brands strategically leverage associations with causes 
that their consumers care about” for their own personal good, which makes 
consumers on the lookout for hypocrite behavior. As such, prosocial behavior 
and profit-seeking endeavors are two concepts that appear to show a disjoin 
nature in a corporate dimension. Consumers seem to not perceive company’s 
sacrifices as those of individuals, since firms concentrate bigger amounts of 
capital and act upon profit. Rich philanthropists that advertise their “social 
worry” are an example of sacrifice that individuals can make but receive similar 
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reaction as firms do, one that is not esteemed due to its marketing nature 
(Porter & Kramer, 2002; Small & Cryder, 2016). 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Cooperation between prosocial behavior and profit can be done through 
correct nudging. The last chapter brought salience to the possibility of social 
impact relating to profit. We understand how traditional socially impactful 
programs are respected by majority of individuals since they address society’s 
issues (Zasuwa, 2011). However, they are still far from being called selfless 
programs, and as such they generate a lot of skepticism on the consumer’s 
perspective. We have established that there is no perfect fit between prosocial 
behavior and profit-seeking, but nonetheless they can cooperate. And the most 
important dimension of this conclusion is to help understand the topic of the 
thesis: what is the relationship between profit-seeking and prosocial behavior? 
Since the question is made on consumer inference, we know now that 
consumers expect and require capital concentrating firms to act on the half of 
their consumers in establishing a better society. If firms do so, even if financial 
outcome is gained, consumers support their socially impactful activities as long 
as that impact is made possible. Prosocial behavior and profit are two 
cooperating terms when firms sacrifice resources to increase community’s well-
being and eventually will reap the benefits of doing so, such as brand image 
externalities. 
Based on the inferences consumers create, they eventually reward or punish 
firms that are believed to do good or bad for the community. The same 
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consumers show concern on the possibility that firms may be hypocritical or 
self-centered with their intentions (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). CSR programs 
are one of the common practices studied and always shows orientation toward 
positive brand attributes through their sustainability programs. 
Since prosocial behavior is defined as positive impact on the agent’s 
surroundings which requires sacrifices made to one’s life, the relationship 
between prosocial behavior and profit-seeking is usually incompatible, but as 
we have seen before, possible. As Small and colleagues stated, not only does 
this form of behavior require a sacrifice from the agent but it also derives strong 
doubt from individuals. Consumers are more judgmental of this norm toward 
firms than toward peers (Small & Cryder, 2016). The consensus over firms that 
have to seek profit no matter what the endeavor is, even if it is a “prosocial 
campaign”, is the source of consumer’s doubt over possible hypocritical 
motivations. Yet, there are still examples of companies who develop socially 
concerned values and are respected by consumers as for-profit firms with 
prosocial behavior, such as Ben&Jerry’s (Small & Cryder, 2016).  
Through correct nudging, the one that respects individual’s freedom and that 
aids consumer’s decision-making for their own wellbeing, the tool’s potential is 
unveiled as a prosocial technique that generate positive response from 
consumers. As we have seen, a nudge is a cost-effective, transparent tool, that 
requires experimentation and observation to be successful, as it is a practical 
tool on actual consumer behavior (Wright et al., 2017). It looks to predictably 
change behavior in a prosocial manner (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). In recent 
years, through nudging literature extension, we are able to acknowledge the 
possibility that nudges may find financial outcome for firms, while also 
inducing positive social impact, as long as their prosocial nature stays true. 
Some nudges, through consumer’s eyes, are harder to identify such as the 
social norms experiment that reduced hotel’s resource waste (N. J. Goldstein et 
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al., 2008). Others are clearer such as he SMarT program that passively increases 
the savings rate for participants, after its enrollment (Richard H Thaler & 
Benartzi, 2004). What nudges do that generates attention towards them, is that 
they have been proven to be of greater success and cost-effectiveness than 
traditional tools, such as CSR. We have been approaching both nudging and 
CSR as prosocial tools, but as we saw in the second chapter, consumers react to 
CSR programs cautiously, afraid that firms will betray their trust and be 
unworthy of their support (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004).  
Nudging appears to be a great instrument that respects societal values, and 
individual’s beliefs (Creyer, 1997) through understanding their decision-
making flaws and placing positive behavioral-inducing suggestions. It also 
matches consumers expectations of what socially impactful firms should do, 
and those expectations are to help individual’s decision-making mistakes 
(Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). Not only does nudging answer the threat of 
consumers being manipulated by firms through looking to neutralize bias and 
not “manipulate” it (Sunstein, 2014b). Through evidence shown, we are able to 
understand the multitude of dimensions nudging can reach, from health, to 
financial, to environmental concerns, successfully overcoming previous existing 
programs through the use of behavioral economics. While matching consumer’s 
beliefs and earning their trust through fair and objective decision-making 
support, the recipients of said help will angle their purchase behavior toward 
increasing their own welfare, which eventually benefits firms that act selflessly 
and provide them with better products, being a symbol of competitive 
advantage over firms that lack a prosocial dimension. 
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